Council Meeting — 18 February 2008

1. The President reported on his activities including:

• 29 January 2008 — Attended meeting of the Council of the Australian Bar Association. Tom Bathurst QC appointed President. Stewart SC appointed Treasurer. ABA unanimously resolved to reaffirm its support for the sole practice rule — our Rule 85(c) in the face of a submission by a solicitor who professed to practice as a barrister to have the rule repealed.
• 29 January 2008 — Attended Canberra for bows dinner, for new Silks in High Court and subsequent dinner.
• 30 January 2008 — Spoke at swearing in of Honourable Justice Fraser.
• 1 February 2008 — Spoke at Valediction of Honourable G N Williams.
• 5 February 2008 — Attended welcome to Honourable Dr Bruce McPherson and Mr Steve Karas as members of the AAT.
• 5-17 February 2008 — Attended the Association’s Annual Conference on the Gold Coast.

2.  The Honorary Secretary reported on a draft protocol negotiated with the Queensland Law Society. The Council is to consider the protocol with a view to resolving on adopting it at the next Council meeting.

3.  Doyle SC and Douglas SC to investigate a protocol for advice to members when being briefed by interstate (at least east coast) solicitors.

4.  The Chief Executive reported that there were 960 members of the Association, including interstate members. There is ensuing work by a sub-committee headed by the Vice President, Byrne QC, and Davis SC, on legal aid criminal fees. It was resolved that the President would call, promptly, a meeting of sub-five year call, and other interested barristers, practising criminal law, to canvass views as to improvements, particularly given the tendency, generated by fee structures, for solicitors to undertake lower level criminal work but to brief high in the Bar once the matter advanced.

5.  Byrne QC addressed the meeting in respect of the response of the Association to the proposed amendments to the Criminal Code pertaining to official corruption. Commentary to be forwarded to the Minister. Bar Association investigation of complaints about barristers to Legal Service Commission canvassed. Applications received by legal practitioners to undertake part-time investigative employment for Bar Association upon such investigations. Stewart SC and Byrne QC reported as to the extensive work load for BAQ entailed in such investigations.

6.  Michael Amerena proposed amendments to the Constitution pertaining to members over 10 years having to guarantee places upon the Council election, together with cognate amendments.

Other Matters Arising Since 18 February Meeting

7.  The President has been conferring with the Chief Justice, the Legal Services Commissioner and the President of the Law Society concerning proposed amendments to the Practice Direction for hearing of matters before the Legal Services Tribunal.

 

Ladies and gentleman — or I should more accurately say, Colleagues — tonight we attend a most unusual and significant event — the launch of a major legal text whose authors are practising members of the Bar,The Law of Rescission by Dominic O’Sullivan of Counsel, and his co-authors Steven Elliott and Rafal Zakrzewski.

And Dominic O’Sullivan of Counsel is, significantly, a member of our own Bar.

An event of this nature, that is, the launch of a major legal text book written by a member of the Queensland Bar is unusual, and, I venture to suggest, almost unique in the achievement of members of the Queensland Bar in the forty years since the publication of Bruce McPherson’s The Law of Company Liquidation, which is now justly recognised throughout the common law world as the classic work on its subject.

I say “almost unique” because Father Frank Brennan SJ AO, who is a member of the Queensland Bar, though he rarely practises, is a prolific author on subjects of legal interest.  Of course, his books are, in his Jesuitical way, usually directed to the destabilisation of democratically elected governments.

The Law of Rescission is not about governments but the rights and duties of private citizens, and, of course. it is directed not at a political audience, but at students, judges and practising lawyers.  

It is because the law of rescission is overwhelmingly judge-made law, that there is a strong need for a work which deals comprehensively with the vast body of judicial decisions, digests those decisions, and then organises them in terms of principle as integral aspects of a coherent system of law.

I venture to suggest that the major beneficiaries of this book will be practising lawyers.  Without reliable text books the risk is greater than ever that the case law will explode into an unintelligible myriad of unreconciled and irreconcilable single instances.  

Even the most powerful intellects among practising lawyers benefit from the application of a powerful organising intelligence of the kind exhibited in this book.

In this regard, one is reminded of the incident recounted in David Marr’s biography of Sir Garfield Barwick where the young Barwick was briefed to appear with the legendary Jack Cassidy QC.  Barwick arrived at Cassidy’s chambers having read all the cases relevant to the matters in issue in the case and proceeded to expound his view of the principles that emerged.  Cassidy asked Barwick what the text writers said.  Barwick said that he didn’t bother reading text books.  Cassidy replied:  “Pity!  There’s a lot of wisdom in text books.”  And then Cassidy went off and won the case with an argument Barwick hadn’t thought of.

There is a lot of wisdom in The Law of Rescission.  It deals with the doctrines which justify rescission; it elucidates the important distinction between rescission by act of a party and by order of the court.  It examines the principles which inform the requirement of “restitution integrum” both at common law and in equity.  It addresses the implications of rescission for third parties and the implications of the rights of third parties for rescission.  It deals comprehensively with the bars to rescission.  And along the way it exposes judicial heresies.  

To mention one particular example by way of a teaser, I commend to you the authors’ analysis of the decisions of the High Court in Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447, Vadasz v Pioneer Concrete (SA) Pty Ltd (1995) 184 CLR 102 and Maguire v Makaronis (1996) 188 CLR 449 and their synthesis of the principles correctly to be derived therefrom.

This wisdom collected in this book means that it will also be of value to judges — for whom it serves as a reminder that the doctrines which are given effect by the remedy of rescission are concerned with the restoration of parties — both parties to their position prior to the transaction — not with compensating an injured party for a bad bargain or punishing a party who has acted in a way of which the judge disapproves.  

The Law of Rescission is truly a magnum opus.  In its 677 pages of text, it collects all the important Australian and English decisions and puts them in their proper place as a coherent part of the law common to England and Wales and Australia.  That its avowed concern is to state the English law, it will not be of any less value to Australian lawyers and judges.  

One cannot but admire the energy of the authors and the lucidity of their exposition.  Dr Johnson remarked of women preachers that, “like dogs dancing, it is not done well, but the wonder is that it is done at all.”  

I can say with unfeigned admiration of Dominic O’Sullivan and his co-authors’ production of this book, while at the same time conducting a practice at the Bar, the wonder is, not only that it has been done at all.  It has been done very well; and, indeed, it is a wonder.  

I congratulate Dominic most warmly, and am emboldened to do so on behalf of our Bar because this book, like McPherson’s, will inevitably add lustre to the reputation of the Queensland Bar.

I commend the book to you all, and hereby launch The Law of Rescission.

Thank you for your attention.

The Hon. Justice Keane

It is timely to consider both the detail of the Government’s proposed “Forward with Fairness” reforms and the first steps that have been taken along the path of reform with the Transitional Bill, which appears now to have the support of the Opposition and, subject to the outcome of a Senate Committee Inquiry into the Bill, is likely to pass into law relatively unscathed.

Although released prior to the election, the Government has not stepped away from its “Forward with Fairness” policy since gaining power.  “Forward with Fairness” proposes the following changes to industrial relations legislation:

• A new organization called “Fair Work Australia” is to be established.  It is to exercise an administrative function (similar to that currently exercised by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (“the AIRC)), and have a separate arm capable of exercising the judicial power of the Commonwealth (currently exercised by the Federal Court and the Federal Magistrates Court).
• Fair Work Australia is proposed to undertake both informal and formal dispute resolution as well as containing an inspectorate that would monitor compliance with the new laws.
• AWAs are to be abolished.  Rather, collective enterprise agreements (“CAs”) are to be the only industrial instruments that can override an award.
• CAs are to be measured against a safety net consisting of 10 legislated minimum employment conditions, to be known as “National Employment Standards” or “NES”, in addition to the relevant award.  The 10 NES will regulate hours of work, parental leave, flexible work for parents, annual leave, personal, carers and compassionate leave, community service leave, public holidays, information in the workplace, termination of employment and redundancy and long service leave.  
• On 14 February 2008 the Government released a discussion paper on the 10 proposed standards which may be located at: www.workplace.gov.au/workplace/Publications/WorkplaceRelations/DiscussionpaperonNationalEmploymentStandards.htm.
• It is proposed that the new standards will take effect from 1 January 2010.
• Awards will be simplified so as only to regulate 10 additional areas, being minimum wages, the type of work performed, arrangements for when work is performed, overtime rates, penalty rates, provisions for minimum annualised wages, allowances, leave, superannuation and consultation, representation and dispute settling procedures.
• If a majority of employees at a workplace want to bargain collectively, their employer will be required to bargain collectively with them in good faith. Good faith bargaining will become a legislative requirement in relation to the negotiation of CAs.  
• There will be no restriction on the matters that parties can put into a CA.
• CAs will only be approved if they meet a “no disadvantage test” by comparison with the relevant award and the 10 legislated minima.  Fair Work Australia would be responsible for assessing the “no disadvantage test”.  CAs will have to be approved “on the papers” within 7 days of lodgement.
• Industrial action will not be allowed during the period of an enterprise agreement.  Even outside the period of an enterprise agreement, industrial action will only be able to be taken after a secret ballot.
• The restriction on employees of organizations with 100 or less employees bringing a claim for unfair dismissal will be removed.  Apparently the only restriction upon bringing a claim for unfair dismissal will be, for employees of organizations with fewer than 15 employees, that they first must have been employed for 12 months, and for employees of organizations with 15 or more employees, that they first much have been employed for 6 months.  Additionally, a remuneration cap for non-award employees (set at $98,200 to be indexed), above which one would be ineligible to make a claim, will continue to apply.
• Unfair dismissal applications will have to be lodged with Fair Work Australia within 7 days (rather than the current 21days) and after receiving an application, Fair Work Australia will call the parties together for a “conference” to determine the matter.  Fair Work Australia will have local offices in regional and suburban areas and be able to go to a workplace or other agreed venue to conduct such conferences.  Although the parties will be allowed to have representation, the employer and employee will be required to respond directly to questions from Fair Work Australia.
• Unlawful dismissal applications will be heard by the judicial arm of Fair Work Australia rather than by the Federal Magistrate’s Court or the Federal Court.

Consistent with the Government’s “Forward with Fairness” policy, the Transitional Bill proposes to ban the creation of any further AWAs.  Instead it creates Interim Transitional Employment Agreements (“ITEAs”) which will cease operation on 31 December 2009.  ITEAs will only be available to employers that on 1 December last year employed at least one worker under an individual employment agreement such as an AWA.  

ITEAs will be subject to a no disadvantage test which will be applied by the Workplace Authority Director who will be required to ensure that a worker’s overall terms and conditions are not reduced in comparison with a “reference instrument”.  ITEAs will operate from the date of lodgement, subject to them later failing the no disadvantage test.

However, AWAs made before the commencement of the new legislation, and lodged within 14 days will be able to operate until terminated or replaced.  Expired AWAs can be terminated by either party on 90 days notice, and upon termination the employee would revert to the CA or award that applied in the workplace.

Collective union and non-union agreements must also pass a no disadvantage test prior to being approved by the Workplace Authority Director and will not commence operation if they fail “fundamental” requirements.  The Transitional Bill also removes the concept of protected award conditions and allows CAs to incorporate terms from other industrial instruments into agreements.

Further, the Transitional Bill commences the award modernisation process, by inserting a new part 10A into the Workplace Relations Act 1996 which requires award modernisation in accordance with a request from the Minister to the AIRC’s president, pursuant to which the AIRC would complete its modernisation process by the end of 2009.  The AIRC will be required to publish an exposure draft of each modernised award and will have the power to hold conferences with unions and employer organizations when developing the draft.  The finalised awards will have to be created by a full bench of the AIRC.

Andrew Rich

The essence of the good sense referred to in this context is reflected in the well- worn truism that opinions are like navels; everyone has one and, in themselves, they are essentially useless. Other anatomical variations may be heard.

Reflecting that general lack of utility, and the fact that it is the role of the court rather than any witness to draw inferences from primary facts in order to determine an ultimate fact in issue, the law of evidence parallels commonsense by generally rejecting as inadmissible the opinion of a witness about a factual matter on which there is no direct evidence (and universally rejecting the opinion of a witness about which case or which party should ultimately prevail).

There are some minor exceptions in relation to matters which are accepted as being able to be reliably inferred by any witness². The primary exception, however, is that which permits experts to give, as evidence, their opinions about the conclusions which may be inferred from the facts proved or assumed before the court.  

The rules of expert evidence are designed to ensure that opinions which fall within the “essentially useless” category do not affect the disposition of litigation. They are, of course, nothing new, and form part of the general legal knowledge of all practitioners. However, some recent experience suggests that their detail can be overlooked in the heat of battle, possibly to the significant detriment of a client against whom purported expert evidence is sought to be asserted by the opponent.

One particular aspect of those rules which, at least in my view, does not always receive the careful and critical consideration required on occasions when one is either faced with or proposes to call expert evidence is the “area of expertise” rule.

The rules generally

Subject to some minor qualifications in later judgements , the seminal contemporary summary of the requirements for admissibility of expert opinion evidence is that by Heydon JA, as he then was, in Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705. At 743-744, His Honour stated:-

Area of expertise

This is the first of Heydon J’s elements. It represents the fundamental threshold for the admissibility of expert opinion, and poses the question as to:-.

In Clarke v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486, Menzies and Windeyer JJ required that there be “an organised branch of knowledge in which the witness is an expert”⁵. The learned author of Cross on Evidence (again, Justice Heydon) observes that “organised branches of knowledge are normally those in which those who are trained or experienced share generally accepted principles and techniques”⁶.

Also in Clarke, Dixon CJ required that the subject matter so far partake “of the nature of a science as to require a course of previous habit, or study, in order to the attainment of a knowledge of it”.  Again, the learned author of Cross observes that “a ‘science’ is usually regarded as something turning on generally accepted principles”⁷.

This rule is related to, but nevertheless quite distinct from, the rule requiring the particular witness to demonstrate appropriate qualifications, training or experience in a relevant area of expertise. The horse must come before the cart.

Obviously, there will be many contexts in which the existence of the relevant area of expertise will be quite uncontroversial and not a matter requiring forensic enquiry by counsel.  Nevertheless, in areas where the asserted expertise is not “mainstream”, the question can be overlooked, particularly when presented with a professionally prepared “expert report” replete with an impressive CV and a collection of apparently scientific or technical appendices which are said to support the witness’ analysis and conclusions.

The example which I offer may well be viewed as mundane or even trivial in terms of its subject matter, but it graphically demonstrates, at least in my view, how failure to apply the fundamentals of expert evidence can lead to a clearly wrong result, possibly accompanied by significant injustice.

The keeping of “pit bull terriers” as domestic pets is restricted generally by State laws⁸, and entirely prohibited by many local governments in their particular areas⁹. Under either legislative scheme, it is an offence to keep a dog contrary to the applicable provisions. More importantly for the ordinary pet owner, Councils which have taken the prohibition route generally have local laws which empower them, without having prosecuted, to seize and destroy a dog which they assert to be of a proscribed breed.

When these matters end up in court¹⁰, the ultimate question for the court is a question of fact as to whether the dog in question is of the prohibited breed or, at least, whether there exists probative evidence of that matter upon which the Council was entitled to act.

The Council, of course, does not know and cannot know the breed of dog in question as a fact, at least in the absence of an admission by the owner¹¹. A number of local governments have sought to bridge this gap by developing their own breed identification process, and by presenting witnesses to the courts as experts in this field, and therefore qualified to give evidence of opinion as to the breed of the dog.

The methodology which these witnesses employee involves comparison of the physical appearance of the dog with descriptions of physical features in a document called a “breed standard”, assigning a score of zero to three against each of the descriptions in that document, and coming up with a final score where some number of points (typically 46 of the possible 66) leads to a conclusion that the dog is of the breed alleged.

These witnesses have been accepted by the Magistrates Court on at least one occasion, including glowing judicial endorsement of their expertise¹². Anecdotally, there have been many similar outcomes.

The problem with all this is that, as revealed by the evidence in a subsequent case in which the matter was squarely raised¹³, the area of expertise which might be described as “breed identification by application of breed standards” appears to be non-existent. The evidence presented in that case, which was unchallenged by the Council except by bare contrary assertion, was that a “breed standard” is a show judging document describing the ideal qualities of a prize-winning specimen, intended to be used by judges and breeders only in a context where the dogs are already known to be pedigreed  examples of the breed. The use of a breed standard for “breed identification” (where breed is unknown and in dispute) was completely rejected in evidence by the author of the standard (called for the owner, and never previously contacted by the Council), and was shown to be unsupported by any professional or technical literature, or any dog breeder, dog judge or other animal professional anywhere.

I should, importantly, point out that the case did not go to judgement on this issue as the Council withdrew and returned the animal to the owner after the completion of evidence but before judgement. The threshold “area of expertise question” was not required to be judicially determined. However, the evidence seems to be objectively compelling, to the point of being overwhelming, that the area of expertise upon which all of the purported expert evidence was based was entirely unrecognised anywhere as a “body of knowledge or experience” meeting the required test.

Accepting that to be the case, it is clear that an injustice has occurred as a result of failure to properly apply the rules of expert evidence in earlier cases in which the evidence has been accepted. In case any reader thinks that “injustice” is too strong in the context of an issue about public safety, all of the cases of which I have direct knowledge concerned ordinary family pets, acquired from friends or acquaintances as backyard cross-breeds of unknown origin, none of which had ever displayed the slightest hint of dangerous or aggressive behaviour. It was all about what the Council thought they looked like. The subject matter may be of minimal money value, but the tears of the owners and their children were real enough.

No criticism is made of anybody appearing for the owners in those earlier matters, as the writer knows nothing about the extent to which counsel, in particular, had an opportunity to fully consider the matter prior to trial, or the extent to which individual owners would have had the financial resources to properly investigate the technical issues in any event. Self-evidently, at least from the owner’s perspective, these cases were not major commercial litigation with a budget to match.

Whether the much better resourced local governments had a responsibility to more carefully investigate these matters in terms of their own evidence, having regard to their “model litigant” responsibilities as a government agency, is, perhaps, a question for another time.

The point for present purposes is to highlight the importance of never assuming (except where the matter is well settled and clearly uncontroversial) that an area of expertise exists merely because the witness (or a government agency) says it does, or merely because the witness has been “accepted” as an expert in previous cases. As long ago as 1960, Clarke v Ryan (supra) illustrated how a purported expert witness who is not in fact entitled to testify can nevertheless carve out a long and lucrative career in that capacity unless the right questions are asked by opposing counsel.  

The dog cases to which I have referred, while obviously conducted in a much less rarefied judicial forum, and with much less at stake (at least objectively, though the families would disagree) confirm that the lessons from that decision remain just as important today, perhaps even more so given that litigation in some jurisdictions (such as the Land Court and Planning and Environment Court) depends almost entirely on the acceptance or rejection of expert evidence¹⁵.

In short, it cannot be assumed that self-appointed expert is an extinct species. The area of expertise rule, while unimportant for the many well-settled areas of expertise encountered day to day, remains an essential part of the armoury to guard against the introduction of purported evidence which in fact lacks any probative value at all.

Stephen Fynes-Clinton

 

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1. See Lipovac v Hamilton Holdings Pty Ltd (unreported, ACT Supreme Court, 13 September 1996) per Higgins J at p 102
2. Such as identification of persons, apparent age, and the bodily plight or emotional state of a person:  see Frecketon & Selby, Expert Evidence, para [7.10] 
3. His Honour’s judgment was revisited by the New South Wales Court of Appeal on 20 May 2005 in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich [2005]  NSWCA 122. Spiegleman CJ (IPP and Giles JJA agreeing), explained that it was sufficient if an expert identifies and asserts the facts upon which his or her opinion is based (without having to disclose other facts known to the expert which could have been relied upon but which he or she says were not relied upon), but otherwise endorsed and applied the principles identified by Heydon JA. Special leave to appeal from that decision was refused by the High Court: [2005] HCA Trans 416.
4. R v Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45 at 46—47.  See also in HG v R (1997) 141 CLR 411, at 432 and Velevski v R (2002) 76 ALJR 402, at 416, both per Gaudron J.
5. at 501—2 and 508.
6. Cross on Evidence, 7th Australian Edition, 2004, para [29055].
7. Ibid.
8. Local Government Act 1993, chapter 17A.
9. Individual Councils can make their own local laws which override the State regime in this regard — LGA, s 1193D.
10. Either by way of prosecution, which appears to be very rare, and more commonly by way of an administrative appeal to the Magistrates Court (where a local law so provides) or by way of proceedings under the Judicial Review Act 1991.
11. Or the unlikely occurrence of a Council witness having been present at the mating of its parents!
12. Maroske v Logan City Council, Magistrates Court, Beenleigh, No. 7195 of 2004, decision given on 22.07.2005.
13. Da Fre v Logan City Council, Magistrates Court, Beenleigh, No. 5440 of 2005 The evidence has been made publicly available at http://www.dafrevlogancc.bigpondhosting.com.
14. The ultimate disposition was that the owner’s appeal was allowed, and the Council ordered to pay the owner’s costs.
15. Even in the ordinary civil courts, the conduct of any substantial litigation without an attempt to introduce expert evidence on some issue or other seems to be the exception rather than the rule.

The paper is published by an “Independent Review Panel” appointed by Premier Bligh to review the Freedom of Information Act 1992. The three member panel is led by well known barrister, constitutional commentator and writer, Dr David Solomon, who is joined by former bureaucrat, Ms Simone Webbe, and McCullough Robertson solicitor, Dominic McGann. The decision to appoint the panel was made on 17 September 2007. Accordingly, it cannot be said the panel has sat on its hands — producing a 214 page discussion paper in a little over 4 months, festive season included. Contrast this with the proposed timetable outlined by the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) for a similar review of the Commonwealth FOI Act which was announced on 24 September 2007:  the ALRC plans to release an issues paper in March-April 2008, followed by a discussion paper in August-September 2008². The Queensland timetable, however, was imposed by the Terms of Reference and one cannot help but think the result is a discussion paper which has more the flavour of an issues paper.

In addition to requiring the premature publication of a discussion paper, the Terms of Reference given to Dr Solomon’s panel are as wide-ranging as the Eastern Grey Kangaroo³. They require the panel to “identify ways to improve and modernise the FOI regime” by addressing issues ranging from the “the purposes and principles of freedom of information” to the minutiae of “the appropriateness of current time limits contained in the Act”. In doing so, the panel is exhorted to consider, but not limit itself to, a lengthy list of matters including interstate and overseas FOI reviews and practices. 

The resulting discussion paper is a bold attempt by the panel to touch on each of the matters set forth in the Terms of Reference and then invite community submissions in relation to them. While, for students and legal scholars alike, the paper contains an excellent outline of the history of the Queensland FOI Act and its many amendments, as well as a comparative review of FOI schemes in other jurisdictions of relevance, many other topics are, of necessity, dealt with superficially.  

There are not less than 132 questions posed by the discussion paper which, handsomely, beats the 75 discussion points outlined in the last discussion paper which sought community input upon a review of the FOI Act in 2000.⁴  The questions range from important philosophical issues to nuts and bolts issues. Compare, for example, “Is there a public ‘right’ to information held by the government, information about the personal affairs of people and about the way government is conducted?” with: “Should the exemptions in s.45(1)(a) and (b) also be made subject to a public interest test?”. Surely, the task of choosing which of the multitudinous questions to address will prove daunting for stake-holders.

In this regard, the discussion paper does very little to promote community discussion because there is no focus. If it is intended to have a genuine discussion about some of the philosophical underpinnings of the FOI regime (as is apparently intended), then some focus to that discussion needs to be given without simultaneously seeking a discussion on a range of narrower issues. The big picture should be painted first.

For all its limitations, the discussion paper contains some information that may be of use to the legal practitioner, including a helpful overview of information privacy laws and practices in all Australian jurisdictions.⁵ Any practitioner looking for an inexpensive annotated FOI Act, however, will be disappointed.

If you wish to make a submission in response to any of the 132 questions posed in the discussion paper, you will also have to be quick: submissions close 7 March 2008. However, there is an indication that extensions may be granted. The Discussion Paper is free and available online at www.foireview.qld.gov.au or in hard copy from the Panel Secretariat on 32222309.

GAVIN REBETZKE
Roma Mitchell Chambers
 

Discussion Paper, 29 January 2008

Freedom of Information Independent Review Panel (Solomon, D., S. Webbe, and D. McGann)

 

Footnotes

1.   Bligh, A. M., Press conference, 17 September 2007, quoted in the discussion paper, page 16.
2.   ALRC website: http://www.alrc.gov.au/inquiries/current/foi/timetable.htm  (accessed 26 February 2008)
3.   Macropus giganteus. See http://museumvictoria.com.au/DiscoveryCentre/Infosheets/Eastern-Grey-Kangaroo/ .
4.   Parliamentary, Legal, Constitutional and Administrative Review Committee, Freedom of Information for Queensland, Discussion Paper 1, 9 February 2000, referred to in the discussion paper under review, page 32.
5.   At Appendix 1.  Incidently, the ALRC published a Discussion paper Review of Australian Privacy Laws in September 2007.