Language – Suborn

The Cambridge Dictionary gives the meaning as:

‘to persuade someone, for example by offering them money, to commit an illegal act, especially to tell lies in a court of law’

In Campbells Cash and Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Limited [2006] HCA 41; (2006) 229 ALR 58; (2006) 80 ALJR 1441 (30 August 2006), Gleeson CJ said (at [93]):

As for fears that “the funder’s intervention will be inimical to the due administration of justice”[102], whether because “[t]he greater the share of the spoils … the greater the temptation to stray from the path of rectitude”[103] or for some other reason, it is necessary first to identify what exactly is feared. In particular, what exactly is the corruption of the processes of the Court that is feared? It was said, in In re Trepca Mines Ltd (No 2) [[1963] Ch 199 at 219-220], that “[t]he common law fears that the champertous maintainer might be tempted, for his own personal gain, to inflame the damages, to suppress evidence, or even to suborn witnesses”. Why is that fear not sufficiently addressed by existing doctrines of abuse of process and other procedural and substantive elements of the court’s processes? And if lawyers undertake obligations that may give rise to conflicting duties there is no reason proffered for concluding that present rules regulating lawyers’ duties to the court and to clients are insufficient to meet the difficulties that are suggested might arise.

In R v WBS [2022] QCA 180 (20 September 2022), Dalton JA said:

[21] The Snapchat messages contained the statements:

● “What you are saying can get me into a lot of trouble. Please don’t do that to me. What you are doing is going to Remove [me] from your life. I don’t understand why.”

● “what you wrote about me, it could put me in jail for a long time.”

● “I know how it looks but, if you can’t take back what you said and explain that it wasn’t true.”^[16]

● “Please be careful with what you say and please, please delete these messages, or it could be more damaging not to you but to me.”

[22] These statements fell into recognised categories of conduct which might attract an Edwards-type direction. They amounted to attempts to suborn the complainant, pervert the course of justice and have the complainant destroy evidence of the Snapchat messages which, at least on one view of it, contained implied admissions of sexual offending. This was conduct analogous to lies: it was conduct designed to deceive, paint a false picture and conceal the truth.

With respect to the integrity of evidence, rule 68 of the Barristers’ Conduct Rules (Qld) provides:

A barrister must not:

a. advise or suggest to a witness that false or misleading evidence should be given nor condone another person doing so; or

b. coach a witness by advising what answers the witness should give to questions which might be asked.